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ABSTRACT 
An examination of State of Connecticut v. Julie Amero provides insight into how 
a general lack of understanding of digital evidence can cause an innocent 
defendant to be wrongfully convicted. By contrast, the 101-page opinion in 
Lorraine v. Markel American Insurance Co. provides legal precedence and a 
detailed consideration for the admission of digital evidence. An analysis of both 
cases leads the authors to recommend additions to Law School curricula designed 
to raise the awareness of the legal community to ensure such travesties of justice, 
as in the Amero case, don’t occur in the future. Work underway at the University 
of Washington designed to address this deficiency is discussed.  
Keywords: digital forensics, law education, ESI, admissibility, evidence 
1. INTRODUCTION / BACKGROUND 
There is an alarming gap in the legal and judicial community’s understanding of 
digital evidence. This was brought home vividly after one of the authors received 
a call from an attorney acquaintance seeking advice on a case involving 
incriminating emails that were pending admission as evidence in a contentious 
divorce case. The accused wife was an injured Iraqi War veteran whose husband 
sought dissolution, as well as all of the couple’s assets and full custody of their 
children, based on her alleged crimes of cyber stalking. As evidence, the 
husband’s lawyer provided paper copies to the judge of incriminating emails that 
did indeed appear to emanate from the wife’s account. Without legal challenge, 
the judge was inclined to admit it. Endicott-Popovsky recommended that the 
related digital email files be requested from the husband’s lawyer, who agreed to 
forward them immediately.  Three weeks later, the digital email files still were not 
forthcoming and the  lawyer--and his client—dropped the allegations against the 
wife of violation of Washington State’s strict cyber stalking statutes and withdrew 
the ”evidence” from the judge’s consideration. You can draw your own 
conclusion why this “evidence,” initially so compelling according to the other 
side, was quietly withdrawn.  
This entire episode gave pause. Had the wife’s attorney not known of one 
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Author’s interest in digital forensics, he might not have called. Had the judge then 
admitted the evidence proposed by the husband’s counsel, a serious miscarriage 
of justice almost surely would have ensued. The tragedy of a veteran of active 
duty service, and a woman at that, officially being labeled a cyberstalker, stripped 
of her parental rights and losing her assets (not to mention the effect that this 
would have on the children) was chilling to contemplate and reminiscent of the 
Julie Amero case which has become a legend among digital forensics experts and 
which will be discussed in more detail later. Examination of additional cases 
confirms this experience, resulting in our recommendation that education in a 
range of subjects related to digital evidence be added to law school curricula 
where, unfortunately, today it often is not. 
Failing to provide lawyers and judges with sufficient education in digital evidence 
can result in serious miscarriages of justice and disruption of the legal system. 
The innocent will be wrongly convicted and incarcerated; those deserving of 
punishment will get away with crimes. Society as a whole would be better served 
by increasing the legal and judiciary communities’ understanding of digital 
evidence (Endicott-Popovsky and Horowitz 2012).  This will require that schools 
of law an engage in an effort to identify what needs to be taught.  
2. STATE OF CONNECTICUT V. JULIE AMERO 
State of Connecticut v. Julie Amero exposed how legal ignorance of digital 
evidence could have a profound impact on an individual’s life. Defendant, Amero 
was convicted on four charges of Risk of Injury to a Child, which carried up to a 
40-year sentence (Kantor 2007). Following four delays in sentencing, a new trial 
was granted when the conviction was overturned on appeal. After years of 
suffering under a cloud of suspicion, wanting to put the nightmare behind her, 
Amero pled guilty to disorderly conduct, her teaching license was revoked, and 
she paid a $100 fine (Krebs 2008). 
To summarize the facts of the case, Julie Amero was substitute-teaching a seventh 
grade classroom on October 19, 2004. After stepping out of the hallway for a 
moment, she found two students browsing a hairstyling site. Shortly afterwards, 
the computer browser began continuously opening pop-ups with pornographic 
content. She was explicitly told not to turn off the computer, and was unaware 
that the monitor could be shut off. Students were exposed to the pornography. The 
primary evidence admitted by the court was the forensic duplicate of the hard 
drive on the computer in question. While the forensic investigator did not use 
industry standards to duplicate the hard drive, the information was used in the 
investigation (Eckelberry et al. 2007). The evidence purported to show Internet 
history of pornographic links that indicated the user deliberately went to those 
sites (Amero Trial Testimony 2007). 
Later pro bono forensics experts for the defendant showed that antivirus 
definitions were not updated regularly and at the time were at least three months 
out-of-date. Additionally, no antispyware or client firewall was installed and the 
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school's content filter had expired (Eckelberry et al. 2007).  
2.1 Evaluation of digital evidence by Judge and attorneys 
During the trial, the judge refused to allow full testimony from the defense expert 
witness Herb Horner, noting that the information was not made available 
beforehand. That information was relevant to gaining a full understanding of the 
digital evidence crucial to the case. The decision not to admit it indicates a 
troubling lack of understanding of the nature of digital evidence. Horner’s 
evidence should have been provided to the jury (Amero Trial Testimony 2007). 
Maintaining a digital chain of evidence is essential for admissibility of any digital 
evidence. In State v. Amero, this is questionable based on the uncertainty of the 
forensic duplicate process (Eckelberry et al. 2007). Additionally, timestamp 
differences between the e-mail server (the time authority in the school system’s 
network), and the computer in question, as a witness stated, “was ten or twelve 
minutes. I don't remember who was faster and who was slower” (Amero Trial 
Testimony 2007). Both of these discrepancies should put into question the 
authenticity of the digital evidence, although neither arose as a strong defense 
argument. This indicates that the attorneys did not have sufficient technical 
knowledge to evaluate the evidence.     
Further, the judge did not find relevant the preparations taken by one expert 
witness to examine the hard drive forensically. This is necessary to provide 
foundation for admissibility and authenticity of digital evidence (Amero Trial 
Testimony 2007). The defense attorney did not question authenticity based on the 
time stamp differences between PC and server, nor did the defense make an 
argument regarding the process of the forensic investigation. Similarly, the 
prosecution did not have a proper understanding of how to show the digital 
evidence in ways consistent with the actual event, as seen by their display of full 
size pornographic pictures instead of thumbnails.  
On the basis of the transcript of the case, the questions attorneys asked (or did not 
ask) of witnesses also indicated low computer literacy. While expert witnesses are 
important to the case, the technical knowledge of the attorneys (with the judge’s 
permission) guided the questioning of the witnesses. 
The prosecuting attorney, when questioning the defense expert witness, 
apparently did not understand the information being provided. A lack of 
understanding on the attorney’s part resulted in a lack of precision in direct 
questioning that could have elicited more meaningful answers from the witness. 
The following dialogue between the prosecuting attorney (questioning) and the 
defense expert witness is an example: 
1. Q So in order for it to show up on the temporary Internet files, that person 
would have to actively go to that site, correct? They were not redirected 
to that site, correct? 
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2. A Wrong. 
3. Q Okay. 
4. A You don’t understand. 
5. Q I hear you saying that.Give me more questions. (Amero Trial 
Testimony 2007) 
One line of questioning by the defense regarded computer functions related to the 
Internet, adware, spyware, and viruses (Amero Trial Testimony 2007). Cross-
examination containing phrases such as ‘parasites’ and other incompetent 
questioning further displayed a low level of computer literacy from attorneys on 
both sides. When the prosecutor displayed full-size pornographic pictures in the 
courtroom, the defense did not argue, as it should have, that the relative size of the 
pictures displayed for the jury was not consistent with the pop-up size thumbnails 
displayed in the classroom. The lack of a specific argument by the defense against 
using a full size display in the courtroom contributed to a false impression that 
prejudiced the jury (Willard 2007). 
2.2 Expert witness testimony 
The following section will detail the expert witness testimony in the Julie Amero 
case. 
2.2.1 Bob Hartz, IT Manager 
This case heard several expert witnesses, each of whom provided information that 
proved to be misleading. The jury heard testimony from Bob Hartz, IT Manager 
for the Norwich Public Schools first. Hartz’s testimony provided information on 
server logs that provided a history of sites accessed from the computer in 
question. His testimony also provided a basic understanding of the computer 
environment at the School district, including notice that the timestamps between 
server/firewall logs and the computer were either 10-12 minutes ahead or behind. 
Additionally, he testified that the content filtering was not working, as it “had not 
been updated correctly” (Amero Trial Testimony 2007). 
During Hartz’s testimony, he was asked a series of questions regarding the 
possibility of certain events occurring, based on his 20-plus years of experience in 
the field. His answers provided misleading information. When asked if it were 
possible to be in an ‘endless loop of pornography,’ referring to the continual 
pornographic popups, Hartz stated, “I've never seen that, so I would have to say 
probably not” (Amero Trial Testimony 2007). Additionally, when asked whether 
spyware and adware generates pornography, Hartz replied, “I’m not aware they 
do” (Amero Trial Testimony 2007). Both of these replies were speculative and 
should have been challenged, along with his experience to respond competently to 
questions involving malicious activity on the Internet. 
2.2.1 Detective Mark Lounsbury 
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Detective Mark Lounsbury, the computer crimes officer for the Norwich Police 
Department, was the officer who personally copied and examined the hard drive. 
From testimony given by Lounsbury, it appears that he may have investigated the 
original hard drive rather than the copy he claimed to have made. Best practice is 
to preserve the original hard drive for evidentiary purposes, and to perform the 
investigation on the forensic duplicate (Noblett, Pollitt, et al. 2000). Any digital 
forensic expert should know that direct access to the hard drive, including 
opening files, will alter the files from the original state—which in turn alters the 
evidence. 
Another revealing insight into the incompetence of Lounsbury’s hard drive 
examination was revealed in his answer to the question, “Did you examine the 
hard drive for spyware, adware, viruses or parasites?” (Amero Trial Testimony 
2007) He responded that he had not. Digital forensics best practices include 
examination for event correlation that searches for causes of activities in question 
(NIST 800-61 2008). It is safe to say that poor examination procedures, led to 
missed findings that were directly relevant to the case. 
2.2.2 Herb Horner, defense expert witness 
Herb Horner, a self-employed computer consultant, was called in by the defense 
as an expert witness. Horner obtained the hard drive copy from the police, and 
then created copies for his investigation. Horner’s testimony was cut short by the 
judge’s decision not to continue with information that was not provided 
beforehand to the prosecution. Horner later stated, "This was one of the most 
frustrating experiences of my career, knowing full well that the person is innocent 
and not being allowed to provide logical proof. If there is an appeal and the 
defense is allowed to show the entire results of the forensic examination in front 
of experienced computer people, including a computer literate judge and 
prosecutor, Julie Amero will walk out the court room as a free person." (Kantor 
2007). The information that was to be presented by Horner was evidence of 
spyware on the computer, which was caused pornographic pop-ups (Amero Trial 
Testimony 2007). As Horner stated to the judge while the jury was dismissed, 
“there were things done before the 19th that led to this catastrophe, and this is a 
fact” (Amero Trial Testimony 2007). Despite this, evidence that spyware caused 
the pop-ups still was not allowed into the record. 
2.3 Legal results 
Legal precedence cited in State v. Amero was limited. There was one mention of 
U.S. v. Frye during an objection to the admissibility of expert testimony by Hartz 
on the basis that he did not lay proper foundation for his testimony (Amero Trial 
Testimony 2007). The prosecution argued that the Hartz’s expertise was based on 
his described twenty years of experience, and the judge found this sufficient 
(Amero Trial Testimony 2007). 
During the same exchange, the defense cited State v. Porter to argue that the 
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reliability of scientific information was a major issue. In State v. Porter, the 
Connecticut Supreme Court adopted the Federal standard set by U.S. v. Daubert, 
however, questioning continued due to lack of clarity on what the defense was 
objecting to specifically (Amero Trial Testimony 2007). 
The primary law cited in this case was risk of injury to a minor, Connecticut 
General Statute Section 53-21(a)(1), from which the charges stemmed. There 
were no laws or regulations cited relevant to digital evidence admissibility. 
The defendant was found guilty on four counts of Risk of Injury to a Child, with 
the possibility of a 40-year prison sentence. After four delays in sentencing, the 
State Court of Appeals reversed the lower court decision and a motion for a new 
trial was accepted. She pled guilty to a misdemeanor to get the nightmare behind 
her. As part of the deal, she agreed to have her teaching license revoked. The 
emotional toll on her and her family was extreme, and the stress of trial resulted in 
many health problems. She has become a cause celebre for digital forensics 
experts ever since. 
3. LORRIANE V. MARKEL AM. INS. CO.  
There are a few examples where the justice system has properly handled the 
admission of digital evidence. We transition from an example of glaring 
misunderstandings and lack of knowledge of digital evidence (Amero case), to an 
analysis of a competent judicial opinion regarding digital evidence, the case of 
Lorriane v. Markel American Insurance Company.  The opinion proceeding from 
the ruling made by Chief United States Magistrate Judge Paul W. Grimm has set 
major legal precedence (Lorraine v. Markel Am. 2007). The case arose from an 
insurance payment dispute. The actual facts of the case are not important; the 
opinion of Judge Grimm is. It provides a detailed procedure for admitting digital 
evidence. The following section will summarize each step and requirement of the 
process.   
3.1 Digital evidence admissibility process  
The first criteria for gauging admissibility of digital evidence is based on Federal 
Rules of Evidence Rule 104. Judge Grimm explained that determining the 
authenticity of Electronically Stored Information (ESI) is a two-step process 
(Lorraine v. Markel Am. 2007). First, 
6.  “...before admitting evidence for consideration by the jury, the district 
court must determine whether its proponent has offered a satisfactory 
foundation from which the jury could reasonably find that the evidence is 
authentic” (Lorraine v. Markel Am. quoting U.S. v. Branch).  
Secondly,  
7.  “...because authentication is essentially a question of conditional 
relevancy, the jury ultimately  resolves whether evidence admitted for its 
consideration is that which the proponent  claims” (Lorraine v. Markel 
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Am. quoting U.S. v. Branch).  
Relevance is the first requirement for admissibility of evidence (Fed. R. Evid. 
401). Evidence is sufficient, in terms of relevance, if it has “…any tendency’ to 
prove or disprove a consequential fact in litigation” (Lorraine v. Markel Am. 
2007). Of importance, if evidence is not relevant, it is never admissible according 
to Fed. R. Evid 402. In terms of the case at hand, Lorraine, the emails were 
determined to be relevant to the case (Lorraine v. Markel Am. 2007).  
The next step in determining admissibility of ESI is its authenticity as guided by 
Federal Rules of Evidence 901 and 902. Judge Grimm submits that the 
authenticity of digital evidence is an important requirement, and that the degree of 
admissibility only need be sufficient in terms of showing the evidence is what it is 
purported to be (Lorraine v. Markel Am. 2007). Specifically, the non-exclusive 
examples provided by Rule 901(b) can be studied to know how to address 
authentication of ESI in Rule 901(a) (Lorraine v. Markel Am. 2007).  
Federal Rules of Evidence 902 shows twelve non-exclusive methods that can be 
used for ‘self-authentication’ of digital evidence (Lorraine v. Markel Am. 2007): 
(1) Domestic Public Documents That Are Sealed and Signed.  
(2) Domestic Public Documents That Are Not Sealed but Are Signed and 
Certified.  
(3) Foreign Public Documents.  
(4) Certified Copies of Public Records. 
(5) Official Publications.  
(6) Newspapers and Periodicals 
(7) Trade Inscriptions and the Like.  
(8) Acknowledged Documents.  
(9) Commercial Paper and Related Documents.  
(10) Presumptions Under a Federal Statute.  
(11) Certified Domestic Records of a Regularly Conducted Activity.  
(12) Certified Foreign Records of a Regularly Conducted Activity.  
These methods establish a practice of authentication that can be performed 
without the need for expert witness testimony, although the lack of such 
testimony does not exempt evidence of authentication from challenge (Lorraine v. 
Markel Am. 2007; Fed. R. Evid. 902).  
Procedurally, evidence that is already deemed relevant and authentic must also 
withstand any argument of hearsay. Rule 801 governs hearsay, and states that 
electronic writings or other information generated entirely by a “computerized 
system or process” is not made by a person, and therefore cannot be considered 
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hearsay (Lorraine v. Markel Am., 2007). There are exemptions to the hearsay rule 
within the Federal Rules of Evidence, which Judge Grimm linked to ESI in his 
opinion. These included Fed. R. Evid. 803(1-3, 6, 7, 17) (Lorraine v. Markel Am. 
2007). 
The Original Writing Rule is considered the next hurdle for electronic evidence 
admissibility, which is included in Federal Rules of Evidence 1001-1008. Rule 
1002 ensures the ‘best evidence’ available and applies when a “writing, recording 
or photograph is being introduced to ‘prove the context of a writing, recording or 
paragraph’” (Fed. R. Evid. 1002). Rule 1003 states that duplicates of evidence can 
be admitted in place of originals unless the authenticity of the original is in 
question (Lorraine v. Markel Am. 2007). In determining whether secondary 
evidence can be included in place of an original, Rule 1004 provides guidance.  
The summary of the guidelines from the Federal Rules of Evidence cited in the 
Lorraine opinion follows:  
 
Table 1: Rules of Evidence Identified in Lorraine v. Markel as Guidance for 
Digital Evidence Admissibility 
Legal Guidance Subject 
Federal Rules of Evidence 
104(a) 
Federal Rules of Evidence 
104(b) 
Preliminary Questions; relationship 
between judge and jury 
Federal Rules of Evidence 
401 
Federal Rules of Evidence 
402 
Relevance 
Federal Rules of Evidence 
901 
Authenticity; including examples of 
how to authenticate 
Federal Rules of Evidence 
902 
Self-Authentication; including 
examples  
Federal Rules of Evidence 
801 
Federal Rules of Evidence 
803 
Hearsay; including exceptions to the 
hearsay 
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Federal Rules of Evidence 
804 
Federal Rules of Evidence 
807 
Federal Rules of Evidence 
1001 through 1008 
 
Original Writing Rule; also known as 
the “Best Evidence Rule.” Includes 
use of accurate duplicates.  
Federal Rules of Evidence 
403 
Balance of Probative Value with 
Unfair Prejudice 
 (Lorraine v. Markel Am. 2007; LexisNexis 2007) 
3.2 Applicability to State of Connecticut v. Julie Amero  
The next section applies, retrospectively, digital forensic guidelines established in 
Lorriane v. Markel to State of Connecticut v. Julie Amero to determine whether 
this would have resulted in a different outcome. As a note, the trial portion of the 
Amero case preceded the Lorraine v. Markel Am. opinion by four months in 2007. 
While Amero could not have capitalized on the Lorraine opinion, an analysis 
helps identify knowledge the legal participants in Amero should have had to 
ensure the case was properly adjudicated.  
4. ANALYSIS 
4.1 Digital evidence admitted 
The primary piece of digital evidence in the Amero case was the hard drive. The 
opinion of Judge Grimm includes methods describing how to handle the 
admissibility of this type of evidence (Section 4.5).  
4.2 Evaluation of digital evidence by Judge and attorney  
State v. Amero is an appalling example of the blindness of the legal system when 
computer literacy of the judge and lawyers is at the very low end of the spectrum. 
The proceedings of this case highlight the need for even the most basic 
understanding of how computers operate, including the threats to computer 
systems that can cause the pop-up symptoms argued by the defense. In State v. 
Amero, the lawyers did not question the authenticity of expert testimony 
describing the behaviors of viruses and spyware. Of more importance, the lawyers 
did not put forth a clear and full objection to the digital evidence presented. The 
Lorraine v. Markel Am. opinion specifically states that the burden of ensuring that 
digital evidence is what it purports to be depends largely on objections by 
opposing counsel. Thus, it is the responsibility of lawyers to be sufficiently 
knowledgeable to object competently to faulty evidence. 
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4.3 Expert and witness testimony 
Amero provided an example of the affects expert testimony can have on a case. 
The numerous errors of so-called experts swayed the outcome of this case, and 
further exposed the lack of basic computer literacy among the professional legal 
participants. The opinion rendered in Lorraine v. Markel Am. references examples 
provided by Fed. R. Evid. 901 as methods to authenticate digital evidence, 
including the call for an expert witness. Laying proper foundation qualifying the 
expert witness, as well as directing a competent line of questioning, rely heavily 
on the computer literacy of the lawyers involved. Reliance on digital forensic 
“expert” witnesses was key to State v. Amero, although the line between 
testimony and speculation was crossed. An objection to speculation as to whether 
spyware could produce pop-up pornography would have been warranted, given 
that opposing counsel had some knowledge of computer threats. 
4.4 Legal precedence 
Legal precedence is scarce in the area of digital evidence, although it is building. 
Some cases establish sound precedence, as indicated in Lorraine. While Daubert 
and Frye have established general guidance for admission of scientific evidence, 
the science of digital forensics is new and evolving (Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
1993; Frye v. U.S. 1923). The speed of technological change is at odds with the 
time it takes for legal precedence to accumulate. This impacts every court case 
involving a computer, and hardly any don’t—whether we’re talking civil cases, 
such as divorces, or criminal cases where digital evidence plays a significant role. 
The legal system lags in handling digital evidence adequately (Endicott, Chee, et. 
al. 2007). In State v. Amero, Frye and Daubert were cited in an objection by the 
defense, yet neither was applied appropriately. In order to build an adequate 
digital evidence curriculum for law schools, extensive review of relevant legal 
cases will be required. This is a matter for future research. 
4.5 Laws and regulations identified 
In Amero, first the court should have determined whether a satisfactory 
foundation had been laid before the jury viewed the evidence (United States v. 
Branch 1992; Fed. R. Evid. 104). Then relevance should have been considered 
(Fed. R. Evid. 401 and 402), then authenticity guided by Fed. R. Evid. 901 and 
902. Application of the hearsay Rules (Fed. R. Evid. 801-807) and the Original 
Writing Rule (Fed. R. Evid. 1001-1008) would follow in order to fully ensure the 
evidence, and duplicates of the evidence, were what they purported to be 
(Lorraine v. Markel 2007). 
4.6 Legal Result 
What is missing from most analyses of the Amero case is the larger picture of the 
emotional and health effects on the innocent. Julie Amero, who faced forty years 
in jail, went through tremendous emotional stress, and had a series of health issues 
arise including a tragic miscarriage (Cringely 2008). Her family relationships 
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were also impacted. While the legal system eventually righted the wrong inflicted 
on Amero, the accumulated health and personal impacts cannot be undone. This 
will be repeated again and again until we have a more predictable legal system 
when it comes to the use of digital evidence. The contribution by Judge Paul W. 
Grimm’s opinion in Lorraine v. Markel Am. provides the basis for guidance in 
this area. There are others emerging, but scant few. 
5. COMPUTER AND DIGITAL FORENSICS EDUCATION 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
State v. Amero and Lorraine v. Markel Am. provide a basis for recommending 
digital evidence educational requirements in schools of law. The following 
recommendations will inform future curricula for the University of Washington’s 
School of Law, and may be useful to others that wish to mitigate deficiencies in 
computer knowledge of lawyers and the judiciary. At a minimum, the curriculum 
must include: 
 Basic computer literacy. This includes an understanding of computer 
vulnerabilities. A basic understanding that a compromised computer 
may show erratic actions not performed (or intended) by the user is 
important and would have prevented the Amero tragedy. This 
knowledge will enable lawyers to establish proper foundation and a 
proper line of questioning.  
 Understanding of the digital forensics process. This includes basic 
knowledge of how easily digital evidence can be altered and what it 
means to have a proper chain of evidence, including storage and 
control. In addition, there should be sufficient knowledge of how 
evidence is collected on a computer hard drive (and on a network), 
how a hard drive is appropriately duplicated for forensic purposes, and 
then searched by forensic tools. This recommendation arises from the 
several glaring errors in the Amero case. It was never established that 
proper steps were taken to maintain a proper chain of evidence during 
forensic duplication and investigation (State v. Amero 2008). 
Additionally, the lack of a search for malware by police initially 
missed crucial evidence. 
 Knowledge of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and how they apply 
to electronic evidence. The Federal Rules of Evidence are integral to 
understanding the process for admitting digital evidence. Lorraine v. 
Markel Am. Insurance Co. provides a framework for applying these 
rules to digital evidence. Fed. R. Evid. 901 and 902 specifically deal 
with authentication of digital evidence, including examples of how to 
do so. This is directly relevant to the Amero case; abiding by this 
framework would have provided a basis for questioning whether the 
digital chain of evidence was reliable, and not broken, during the 
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investigatory process.  
 Survey of case law. A thorough search for relevant cases and an 
extraction of precedence should be conducted before developing 
digital forensics curriculum. Knowledge of how to apply the Federal 
Rules of Evidence as well as Daubert and Frye in cases involving 
digital evidence will provide material for any classes developed 
(Daubert v. Merrell Dow 1993; Frye v. U.S. 1923). A thorough survey 
of other cases will provide and even more comprehensive 
understanding of the state of the practice regarding digital evidence. 
Lorraine v. Markel Am. emphasizes that the burden of ensuring digital 
evidence admissibility rests largely on objections to such evidence by 
opposing counsel. The inability to competently challenge testimony of 
the State’s ‘expert’ witness led to a travesty of justice in the Amero 
case. 
6. CONCLUSIONS  
The above review provides insights into the legal and judicial communities’ lack 
of sufficient knowledge of how to handle digital evidence appropriately and 
consistently. The authors believe this argues for additional curriculum in schools 
of law that educate law students in the challenges of digital evidence: digital 
evidence collection, chain of custody, the challenges of cybersecurity, basic 
computer literacy. The authors recommend that law schools consider adding 
courses in these subjects as they relate to digital evidence. A previously published 
digital forensics course conducted at the University of Washington for a 
combined audience of technical and law students, is an example of what can be 
accomplished with a collaboration between digital forensics/computer science and 
law faculty. Based on a successfully and competently prosecuted case of online 
digital theft and compromise, the course culminates in a moot court that requires 
law students to participate in the preparation and questioning of digital forensics 
experts (computer science students taking the same course) (Endicott-Popovsky, 
Frincke, et al. 2004). This is just the beginning of innovations that the authors 
recommend be incorporated into legal education and training. 
7. FUTURE WORK 
Future work will involve researching existing case law in order to assist the 
University of Washington’s School of Law, in partnership with the Information 
School, in revamping their curriculum to include interdisciplinary courses that 
will improve digital evidence literacy among law students.  It is expected that a 
thorough analysis of cases where digital evidence has been inappropriately 
handled will further refine recommendations for curriculum content made above. 
Work on this project has begun, with preliminary findings discussed in this paper. 
Insights of a thorough examination of case law will be disseminated broadly to 
the digital forensics community. 
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